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REPLY
THE COMPLEX CORE OF PROPERTY
Gregory S. Alexandert
In this Reply, I respond to critiques of my article, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law,' by Professors Henry Smith, 2 Eric
4
Claeys, 3 and Jedediah Purdy.

Bridging the Gap Between Core and Periphery:A Reply to Henry Smith
Professor Henry Smith's critique is grounded in his basic ruleutilitarian point that the right to exclusion must be understood as the
core of ownership, a point that he has eloquently, and repeatedly,
made elsewhere. Not surprisingly, given his earlier works in property
theory, his desire to define ownership as exclusion is based on information-cost considerations. The point is captured in the following
statement from his response:
At its core, property draws on an everyday morality that it is wrong
to steal and violate others' exclusion rights. Because property requires coordination between large numbers of anonymous and farflung people, there are good information-cost reasons for relying
on simple lay moral intuitions when it comes to the basic setup of
property. This does not mean that information costs are the only
reasons for setting things up this way, but an information-cost theory is compatible with a large range of moral theories other than a
narrow case-by-case utilitarianism that disregards the basic problem
of information and morality. Thus, use balancing is reserved for
t A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Eric Claeys, Jed Purdy, and
Henry Smith humble me by writing such thoughtful and penetrating critiques of my article
"The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law." I am deeply grateful to them for
having done so and to the Editors of this volume of the Cornell Law Review for both soliciting their critiques and for giving me the opportunity to reply. I am also greatly indebted to
Hanoch Dagan, Bob Hockett, and Eduardo Pefialver for very helpful comments and suggestions on this Reply. Special thanks to Joe Jolly for excellent editorial work.
I Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-ObligationNorm in American Property Law, 94 CoRNELL

L. REv. 745 (2009).

2 Henry E. Smith, Response, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and
Means in American Prperty Law, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 959 (2009).
3
Eric R. Claeys, Response, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L.
REv. 889 (2009).
4 Jedediah Purdy, Response, A Few Questions About the Social-ObligationNorm, 94 CORNELL

L. REv. 949 (2009).
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situations of high stakes in which other solutions (like contracts) are
5
not likely to work.

Property, in other words, is exclusion, and everything else is a deviation from property.
There is a basic difficulty in Smith's response. He conflates the
binary opposition between exclusion and social obligation, or as he
has framed it in his earlier work, exclusion and governance, 6 with the
more familiar distinction between rules and standards, treating these
7
two binary oppositions as though they were somehow synonymous.
Throughout his response, Smith implies that his critique of my article,
targeting as it does my ostensible support of open-ended standards,
entails a critique of my support of the social-obligation norm in property law. But this entailment is false. There are multiple ways to reconcile support of rules, or at least rule-like norms, with a relatively
robust conception of the social-obligation norm. One path, which
Dean Hanoch Dagan has defined with great clarity, is to focus less on
property as such and more on property institutions and the ways in
which the social-obligation norm embedded in these institutions is (or
at least should be) rule-like.8 This approach permits a supporter of
the social-obligation norm to promote stability and predictability in
the property system, a goal that Smith stresses.
The social-obligation theory described and defended in my article is another path. Like Dagan's approach, it suffers from no conflict
between the two binary oppositions. Contrary to Smith's reading, the
social-obligation theory does not involve ad hoc analysis of the sort he
describes. Nor does it purge exclusion from the core of ownership.
What the social-obligation theory recognizes-and Smith does not-is
that the core of property is complex, certainly more complex than the
simple image of the virtually absolute right to exclude depicted in
Smith's critique.
Both of these points-my rejection of ad hoc analysis and the
complexity of the core of property-can best be made in the context
of several right-to-exclude cases from New Jersey, a jurisdiction that
has taken the lead in defining the complex core of property. One of
the important New Jersey right-to-exclude cases is Uston v. Resorts Inter5 Smith, supra note 2, at 971 (citations omitted).
6 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategiesfor Delineating Property
Rights, 31J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) (arguing that exclusion and governance are distinct
components of property rights).
7
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 2, at 976 (noting that "[e]xclusion and governance are
related to rules versus standards").
8 See Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Prperty,91 CAL. L. REv. 1517, 1558-70 (2003) (developing a theory of property as an institution, "structuring and channeling people's relationships" and "subject to ongoing normative . . . reevaluation and possible
reconfiguration"); Hanoch Dagan, Restitution'sRealism, in PHILOSOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF

UNJusr ENRICHMENT (Robert Chalmers et al. eds., forthcoming 2009).
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national Hotel, Inc.9 In that case, an Atlantic City casino excluded Ken
Uston, a well-known card-counter. Uston argued that the casino had
violated its duty to provide reasonable access to the public. The New
Jersey Supreme Court agreed. 10 After noting that the common law
once gave proprietors of places open to the public a nearly absolute
right to exclude, the court said that the common law has since
changed. The modern position is: "'I[T]he more private property is
devoted to public use, the more it must accommodate the rights
which inhere in individual members of the general public who use
that property."' 1 1
Referring to that case, Smith states, "One wonders how it promotes human flourishing to mandate that casinos permit access to
card counters unless the casino commission bans them. 1 2 The connection between human flourishing and access to casinos is indirect,
but it exists. If Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196413 represents a
direct effort to prevent racial exclusion,1 4 which surely promotes
human flourishing, then cases like Uston signify indirect efforts to prevent invidious forms of exclusion by qualifying the right to exclude for
owners who have made their property open to virtually everyone. The
Uston court itself alluded to this connection. In explaining the basis
for its sliding-scale rule, the court referred to the "'good old common
law"' at the heart of both civil rights statutes and the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.1 5 Contrary to what
many commentators believe, the common law has not always given
owners the right to exclude in arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory ways. At the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's enactment,
the common law gave patrons of places open to the public a right of
reasonable access. As the Uston court pointed OUt, 1 6 this broader original common law rule of reasonable access provided grounds for nonwhite plaintiffs to recover damages if owners of restaurants and other
places open to the public refused to serve them. 1 7 Then, a rule of
reasonable access serves to advance the policy of preventing invidious

9
10
11
12

445 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1982).
See id. at 371.

Id. at 374 (quoting State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 629 (N.J. 1980)).
Smith, supra note 2, at 984.
13
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-a6 (2006).
14
The 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on several other grounds in addition to race. Among them are religion and national origin. See id. § 2000a(a).
15
Uston, 445 A.2d at 374 (citing Goldberg v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 296 (1964)
(Goldberg, J., concurring)).
16 See id. at 373-74.
17 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Gies, 46 N.W. 718 (Mich. 1890) (reversing and granting a new
trial to a plaintiff who was denied service on the basis of his race).

1066

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:1063

forms of discrimination in places open to the public, particularly
when a violation of Title II might be difficult to establish. 18
Cases like Uston illustrate that although the right to exclude is
part of the core of ownership, the core is more complex than exclusion alone. How one defines the core of property depends on what
values one thinks property serves. It is no accident that libertarians
strongly tend to define the concept of ownership solely in terms of the
right to exclude. To them, ownership is all about individual liberty
and only individual liberty. A more sophisticated moral theory would
yield a more complex conception of the core of ownership. Such a
theory would understand in pluralistic terms the values that private
ownership serves, including but not limited to individual liberty.
Some other values that ownership serves include human dignity, just
social relations, and self-development. All of these values, along with
others, constitute the moral foundation of the complex core of ownership. The right to exclude, serving as it does the legitimate value of
individual liberty, is not the sole constituent of ownership's core. The
"everyday morality" to which Smith refers is not nearly as limited as he
suggests. 19 Common moral intuitions extend significantly beyond injunctions against theft and trespass. They include perceived obligations to share and conserve, at least at times. Hence, pace Smith,
qualifications on the right to exclude are not deviations from core
moral intuitions underlying property, but rather expressions of those
moral intuitions. Consequently, when courts such as the New Jersey
court in Uston limit the casino owner's right to exclude by the public's
right of reasonable access, they are not deviating from the core of
ownership, but instead are negotiating among a complex collection of
moral components of a common law concept, one courts have long
understood as being multivalent.
Smith's second point concerns the putative ad hoc nature of the
social-obligation theory. Smith's concern is captured in the following
statement: "When Alexander and others see State v. Shack as a paradigm of how to decide property cases, they are advocating removing
any presumption in favor of owners' exclusion rights." 20 There is a
certain ambiguity in this statement. Does Smith mean that I want
owners' rights to exclude to be determined on an ad hoc basis? I am
advocating no such thing.

18 The common law rule permitting proprietors of businesses open to the public a
broad right to exclude developed only later, when American courts began to adopt the
English rule announced in Wood v. Leadbitter, 153 Eng. Rep. 351 (Exch. 1845). See, e.g.,
Shubert v. Nixon Amusement Co., 83 A. 369, 369-70 (N.J. 1912).
19 Smith, supra note 2, at 971.
20 Id. at 983 (citation omitted).
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Smith's error is reading Shack as a purely ad hoc determination.
But viewed in the context of New Jersey right-to-exclude case law,
Shack fits within an identifiable pattern that provides a degree of regularity, if not a strict rule, to New Jersey's right-to-exclude decisions. In
State v. Schmid,21 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that under the
state's constitution, individuals have a free speech right to distribute
political leaflets on the Princeton University campus by virtue of the
fact that the university, though private, invited numerous public uses
of its resources in order to fulfill its broader educational ideals and
goals. Later, in New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v.
JM.B. Realty Corp.,22 the same court held that this free speech right
extended to protestors against the first Gulf War who were distributing leaflets in the "public" areas of shopping malls. And, as I have
already discussed, in Uston, the court restricted a casino owner's right
to exclude a patron, stressing the same factor, namely, "'the more private property is devoted to public use, the more it must accommodate
the rights which inhere in individual members of the general public
who use that property.'-23 Although this norm is certainly a standard,
rather than a binary, on-off rule, it is certainly not at the open-ended,
ad hoc end of the scale where Smith put it. Under Shack and its cognate New Jersey right-to-exclude decisions, an owner's right to exclude is very much alive and well, and the limits on that right are
reasonably predictable.
The social-obligation theory is to similar effect. As I indicated in
the article, 24 the social-obligation theory in the main is consistent with
the strong protection of private property rights, including the right to
exclude. As the New Jersey right-to-exclude cases illustrate, the substantive parameters of the social-obligation norm can develop in a way
that permits robust generalizations regarding the limits of the right to
exclude. The social-obligation norm does not signify the sacrifice of
law-like predictability in the pursuit of purely ad hoc determinations
of what social justice demands. Property remains property; ownership, ownership.
But Smith may have a different objection in mind when he links
Shack with a no-presumption position. He may mean that I do not
want to privilege the right to exclude as somehow enjoying a special
status for ownership as a conceptual matter, in his sense of core-andperiphery. Here, I agree with him, as I have already indicated. However, to the extent that Smith is suggesting that rejecting exclusion as
21
22
23

24

423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980).
650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994).
445 A.2d 370, 374 (N.J. 1982) (quoting Schmid, 423 A.2d at 629 (N.J. 1980)).
Alexander, supra note 1, Part IV.D.
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the sole core of ownership requires purely ad hoc adjudication of actual exclusion rights, he is incorrect, for reasons I have just indicated.
Can Property Law Be Virtuous: A Reply to Eric Claeys
Professor Eric Claeys' critique 25 performs the very useful task of
placing Professor Eduardo Pefialver's 26 and my articles within a
broader intellectual context. Although Claeys is sympathetic with our
efforts to draw attention to the potential contributions of what he calls
"virtue-friendly practical philosophy" to law, particularly property law,
he is wary of some of the normative implications of such an endeavor. 27 Claeys' fundamental doubt is about whether virtue ethics
can or should contribute anything useful to virtue politics. 28 This is,
of course, a large and complex issue, as Claeys recognizes, and I cannot possibly respond to his concerns in anything like a complete way
here. I will confine my comments to a few suggestive remarks that
may indicate why I believe I do not need to address the very difficult
dilemma he poses.
First, I do not think it is helpful to cast the issue in terms of a
choice between "virtue" or "rights." A major theme of Pefialver's article is that we need to have a conversation about how the law can strike
the proper balance between the two. Indeed, I read Claeys' response
as agreeing that the issue needs to be discussed.
Second, and along the same lines, in my view the distinction between ethics and politics is not categorical. Claeys is making the basic
category mistake of supposing that ethics is confined to the personal
realm. Obviously, there is such a thing as personal ethics, but there is
also such a thing as public ethics. Distinguished philosophers such as
Bernard Williams and Michael Oakeshott have made their careers by
developing public ethics. Public ethics concerns politics both in its
most obvious sense, namely, the behavior of public officials, and in its
more quotidian moments with smaller publics. The developing field
of military ethics is yet another variation of public ethics.
Even if one were to agree with Claeys' distinction between ethics
and politics, it would still not follow that ethics has nothing to contribute to law. Claeys' statement that "[m] ost of the law ... belongs to the
field of politics"29 is curiously reminiscent of Critical Legal Studies' slogan in the 1970s. We need not rehearse the debate over that claim to
realize that law differs from politics in ways that make ethics relevant
to law, even if ethics is not relevant to politics. To cite only one exam25
26
27
28
29

Claeys, supra note 3.
Eduardo Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94
Claeys, supra note 3, at 901.
See id. Part II.
Claeys, supra note 3, at 1068.

CORNELL

L. Rw. 821 (2009).
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ple, how else can we understand recent efforts to develop the law gov30
erning lawyers in light of ethical theories?
One senses that, at bottom, what most concerns Claeys is the possibility that an Aristotelian-inspired social-obligation theory will fundamentally undermine private property rights. 3 1 Claeys is, of course,
correct about this. But as I tried to make clear in my article, the social-obligation theory takes private property rights seriously. The theory is inspired, in part, by Aristotle, but it is not strictly Aristotelian.
Other sources, including Kant, Gewirth, and Raz, among others, that
influence the theory do not rest on virtue ethics. Moreover, other
theories, including welfarism, if taken to logical but absurd extremes,
pose the same risk of wiping out the distinction between public and
private ownership. Practitioners of these theories do not follow them
to these lengths for obvious reasons, not the least of which is sound
judgment. There is no reason to suppose that the results should be
any different with virtue politics.
DistributiveJustice and the Social-Obligation Theory:
A Reply to Jedediah Purdy
Professor Jedediah Purdy's response 32 does me the favor of forcing me to clarify the relationship between distributive justice and the
social-obligation theory. It also compels me to clarify the relationship
between the social-obligation theory and the property case law discussed in my article.
To begin with, although the capabilities approach, upon which
the social-obligation theory draws in part, is not a theory of justice in
the distribution of what John Rawls called primary goods, 33 it clearly
has implications for resource distribution. Under the capabilities approach, the relevant distribuenda are human capabilities, but as critics, including Professors Ronald Dworkin and G.A. Cohen have
pointed out, "capabilities" is an ambiguous concept that can be interpreted to include external as well as internal distribuenda.3 4 Even assuming that capabilities include external distribuenda, a program of
justice in the distribution of capabilities does not necessarily commit
See, e.g.,

NaturalLaw as ProfessionalEthics: A Reading of Fuller,in LEGAL
DIGNITY 99 (2007); W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 363 (2004); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics as "PoliticalMoralism" or the Morality of
Politics, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1413 (2008).
31
See Claeys, supra note 3, at 921-29.
32
Purdy, supra note 4.
30

DAVID LUBAN,

ETHICS AND HUMAN

RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 78-80 (rev. ed. 1999) (1971).
See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 285-303 (2000); G.A. Cohen, Equality of
What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 9-53 (Martha Nussbaum
& Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
33
34

JOHN
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Professor Amartya Sen 3 5 or other proponents of the capabilities approach to a full-throated legislative policy of redistribution of income
or wealth. There may be pragmatic or prudential reasons that counsel
against large-scale legislative redistribution of income or wealth on the
basis of the capabilities approach. At any rate, I need not take a position on that question for present purposes.
In the case of the judicial decisions based on the social-obligation
theory, there is no wealth or entitlement redistribution as such. The
term "redistribution" presupposes the existence of some neutral distribution of the property entitlement, which the social-obligation norm
then redistributes. But as my comments on Smith's critique indicate, 3 6 that argument begs the question. The initial distribution of
the entitlement is the very question to be decided. The core of ownership is more complex than the right to exclude standing alone. The
social-obligation theory does not redistribute entitlements so much as
it defines them in the context of this complexity. Thus, cases like State
v. Shack,3 7 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n,38 and Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. New York City, 39 do not involve any judicial redistri-

bution of entitlements. Rather, the courts in those cases defined the
parameters of the ownership involved in each case, finding that the
core of the owner's title consisted of more than the simple right to
exclude all members of the public, including the state. In each of
these cases, the court was considering a question as a matter of first
instance, not modifying prior case law. The court in each case did not
redistribute the owner's entitlement to another individual or to the
public at large on the normative basis of an externally imposed social
good that trumped the owner's interest. Rather, the court concluded
that as a conceptual matter the ownership interest did not include the
asserted right to exclude.
Purdy reads my discussion on property cases "as involving telling
exceptions to the conventional operation of property rights.

' 40

My

aim in discussing the cases I did was twofold: first, to illustrate the
operation of the social-obligation norm, and second, to argue in favor
of a theory that is not only normatively attractive, but also one that
better distills the spirit or direction of recent leading judicial decisions, decisions that have already or are likely to influence other
courts. These cases themselves provide a theory of property entitlement that, as my previous discussion of Smith's critique indicates, de35

For an example of Sen's work on the capabilities approach, see AmARTYA SEN, COM-

MODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985).
36
See supra pp. 1063-68.

37
38
39
40

277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Purdy, supra note 4, at 950.
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fines the contours of the complex core of ownership. In this sense,
then, I resist the characterization of the cases as "telling exceptions to
'41
the conventional operation of property rights.
Finally, Purdy invites me to speculate on how I might have written
my article differently, in a way that more closely follows the ideas that I
developed in an earlier book, Commodity & Propriety.4 2 I can scarcely
improve on the account that Purdy himself provides of "a tradition in
which we-Americans, common lawyers, moderns-make sense of
our lives."' 43 The social-obligation theory is indeed what I called in
that book a "proprietarian" vision. I chose a non-historical mode of
justification because my objective was overtly normative as well as positive. As Purdy correctly points out, Professor Charles Taylor insightfully argues that normative persuasion is best accomplished by
providing accounts of our "social imaginaries, ''44 that is, shared visions
and experiences. Part of the purpose of my discussion of the cases was
to provide just such an account, an account of our modern
proprietarian vision and experience. In this sense at least, my article's
modus operandi is continuous with that of Commodity & Propriety.

41
Id. That said, I find Purdy's equality principle (that is, the idea that inherent in
ownership of market property is the obligation that "all comers must have access to market
relations," see id. at 951) quite attractive. This principle nicely captures cases like Shack, but
I am less certain that it would capture all of the cases covered by my social-obligation
theory (e.g., the beach access cases).
42
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, CoMMorrY 8 PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY
IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 (1997).
43
Purdy, supra note 4, at 954.
44
CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 1-30 (2004).
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